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Abstract
Prototypical instances of disinformation include deceptive advertis-
ing (in business and in politics), government propaganda, doctored 
photographs, forged documents, fake maps, internet frauds, fake 
websites, and manipulated Wikipedia entries. Disinformation can 
cause significant harm if people are misled by it. In order to address 
this critical threat to information quality, we first need to understand 
exactly what disinformation is. This paper surveys the various analyses 
of this concept that have been proposed by information scientists 
and philosophers (most notably, Luciano Floridi). It argues that 
these analyses are either too broad (that is, that they include things 
that are not disinformation), or too narrow (they exclude things 
that are disinformation), or both. Indeed, several of these analyses 
exclude important forms of disinformation, such as true disinforma-
tion, visual disinformation, side-effect disinformation, and adaptive 
disinformation. After considering the shortcomings of these analyses, 
the paper argues that disinformation is misleading information that 
has the function of misleading. Finally, in addition to responding to 
Floridi’s claim that such a precise analysis of disinformation is not 
necessary, it briefly discusses how this analysis can help us develop 
techniques for detecting disinformation and policies for deterring 
its spread.
Introduction
According to Luciano Floridi (2011), philosophy of information is primarily 
concerned with “how information should be adequately created, processed, 
managed, and used” (p. 15). But as he (1996) notes, we also need to study 
what happens when “the process of information is defective” (p. 509). 
Inaccurate and misleading information can be extremely dangerous. 
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When people are misled about important topics, such as investment op-
portunities, medical treatments, or political candidates, it can cause se-
rious emotional, financial, and even physical harm. Libraries and other 
information services are at the forefront of efforts to ensure that people 
have access to quality information instead.
Whether it results from an honest mistake, negligence, unconscious 
bias, or (as in the case of disinformation) intentional deception, inaccurate 
information (or misinformation) can mislead people.1 But in the same way 
that acts of terrorism tend to be more troubling than natural disasters, 
disinformation is a particularly problematic form of misinformation be-
cause it is no accident that people are misled. Unlike an honest mistake, 
disinformation comes from someone who is actively engaged in an at-
tempt to mislead (Fetzer, 2004; Piper, 2002, pp. 8–9). Moreover, in addi-
tion to directly causing harm, disinformation can harm people indirectly 
by eroding trust and thereby inhibiting our ability to effectively share in-
formation with one another. Thus, identifying strategies for dealing with 
the problem of disinformation is particularly pressing. 
Disinformation is nothing new. Prototypical instances include decep-
tive advertising (in business and in politics), government propaganda, 
doctored photographs, forged documents, and fake maps. A standard 
example is Operation Bodyguard, a World War II disinformation campaign 
intended to conceal the planned location of the D-Day invasion. Among 
other deceits, the Allies sent out fake radio transmissions and created 
fraudulent military reports in a successful attempt to convince the Ger-
mans that a large force in East Anglia was ready to attack Calais rather 
than Normandy (Farquhar, 2005, p. 72). However, disinformation seems 
to have become much more prevalent in recent years. 
New information technologies are making it easier for people to cre-
ate and disseminate inaccurate and misleading information (Hancock, 
2007). Hackers have posted false stories on the websites of news services 
like Yahoo! News and the New York Times (Fiore & Francois, 2002). Also, 
investors have been duped by websites that “impersonate” the websites of 
reputable sources of information, such as Bloomberg News (Fowler, Frank-
lin, & Hyde, 2001). Software now allows people to convincingly manipu-
late visual images (Farid, 2009). In addition, anyone with internet access 
can easily (and anonymously) insert inaccurate and misleading informa-
tion into Wikipedia, “the free online encyclopedia that anyone can edit.” 
A notable example is when the entry on the journalist John Seigenthaler 
was edited to say that he was “directly involved in the Kennedy assassina-
tions” (Fallis, 2008, p. 1665). 
Libraries and other information services can easily end up being unwit-
ting (and sometimes witting?) conduits for the spread of disinformation. 
In addition to disinformation that patrons may access over the internet, 
many library collections include government propaganda and historical 
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fabrications (Nesta & Blanke, 1991; Sowards, 1988). As a result, a number 
of information scientists have begun to address the problem of disinfor-
mation (Calvert, 2001; Fallis, 2009; Hernon, 1995; Karlova & Fisher, 2013; 
Lynch, 2001; Piper, 2002; Rubin & Conroy, 2012; Skinner & Martin, 2000; 
Walsh, 2010; Whitty, Buchanan, Joinson, & Meredith, 2012). In fact, the 
American Library Association (2005) has even issued a “Resolution on 
Disinformation, Media Manipulation, and the Destruction of Public In-
formation.”
In order to effectively address the serious threat to information quality 
that disinformation poses, we need to develop techniques for identifying 
disinformation and policies for deterring its spread. However, in order to 
develop such techniques and policies, we first need to improve our under-
standing of the nature and scope of disinformation. Most importantly, we 
need to be able to distinguish disinformation from other forms of misin-
formation.2 After all, the clues that someone is lying to us are likely to be 
different from the clues that she/he just does not know what she/he is 
talking about.
In this paper, I survey the analyses of the concept of disinformation 
that have been offered by various information scientists and philosophers 
(most notably, Floridi). I provide counterexamples to show that the ex-
isting analyses either exclude important forms of disinformation and/or 
include innocuous forms of information that should not be counted as 
disinformation. I then propose and defend a new analysis of the concept 
of disinformation. I close by briefly indicating how this analysis can help 
us deal with this serious threat to information quality.
Conceptual Analysis
The standard philosophical methodology for clarifying concepts is known 
as conceptual analysis (Margolis & Laurence, 2011; Melnyk, 2008). The 
goal of conceptual analysis is to identify a concise set of necessary and 
sufficient conditions that correctly determines whether or not something 
falls under the concept in question. For example, an important project 
in philosophy is the analysis of the concept of knowledge (Feldman, 2003). 
The traditional analysis is that knowledge is justified true belief; in other 
words, the suggestion is that a) being justified, b) being true, and c) being 
a belief are necessary and sufficient for something to be a piece of knowl-
edge. Similarly, an important project in information science is the analysis 
of the concept of information itself. Many different analyses of information 
have been proposed (Floridi, 2005; Fox, 1983, pp. 39–74). 
Philosophers test a proposed analysis of a concept against a set of data 
points. More specifically, they check to see whether what the analysis says 
about various cases matches the intuitions of competent speakers of the 
language about those cases.3 There are two ways that an analysis might 
turn out to be inadequate. First, an analysis can be too broad; for instance, 
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an analysis of knowledge might count as knowledge some things that 
clearly are not pieces of knowledge. Gettier (1963) famously identified 
some justified true beliefs that we would definitely not want to classify as 
knowledge (Feldman, 2003, pp. 25–28). Second, an analysis can be too 
narrow; for instance, an analysis of knowledge might not count as knowl-
edge some things that clearly are instances of knowledge.
With respect to the concept of disinformation, the goal is to find a list 
of criteria such that all instances of disinformation satisfy these criteria, 
and only instances of disinformation satisfy these criteria. In this paper, 
I offer cases that indicate that the existing analyses of disinformation are 
either too broad, too narrow, or both. I offer a new analysis that success-
fully handles all of these cases (or “data points”). 
Using the intuitions of competent speakers of the language to test a 
proposed analysis is a good way to find out whether an analysis captures 
the common usage of terms like knowledge and disinformation.4 However, it 
is important to note that this is just a means to an end. We are ultimately 
concerned with what knowledge and disinformation really are, and not 
just with what people happen to think they are. As the philosopher John 
Austin (1956) explained, “We are looking again not merely at words . . . but 
also at the realities we use the words to talk about: we are using a sharp-
ened awareness of words to sharpen our perception of, though not as 
the final arbiter of, the phenomena” (p. 8; emphasis in original). Thus, 
in addition to capturing our linguistic intuitions about disinformation, it 
matters whether the resulting analysis can actually help us to detect it and 
deter its spread. The ultimate test of an analysis of disinformation will be 
such practical applications.
Three Features of Disinformation
Disinformation Is Information
Before discussing the various analyses of disinformation that have been 
proposed, I begin by identifying three important features of disinforma-
tion that should be fairly uncontroversial. The first of these features is 
that disinformation is a type of information. Now, as noted above, several 
different analyses of information have been proposed. Therefore, exactly 
what it means to say that disinformation is a type of information depends 
on which analysis of information we choose to adopt. However, for our 
purposes here, we will not need to settle on a specific analysis of informa-
tion. Almost everything that I will say about disinformation holds, regard-
less of the specific analysis of information we choose to adopt.
In this paper, I will primarily be appealing to just one central (and fair-
ly uncontroversial) feature of information: that information is something 
that represents some part of the world as being a certain way. In other words, 
it is something that has semantic (or representational) content (Floridi, 
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2011, p. 80; Scarantino & Piccinini, 2010, p. 324). For instance, the text 
“The cat is on the mat” represents the cat as actually being on the mat; 
also, a photograph of the cat can represent it as being on the mat.
Although I do not want to defend a specific analysis of information, 
there are two aspects of certain analyses that I am inclined to resist. First, 
according to some analyses of information (for example, Bates, 2006; 
Buckland, 1991), any object that “one might learn from,” including “fos-
sils, footprints, and screams of terror,” counts as information. The infor-
mation scientist Michael Buckland (1991) has most famously defended 
this notion of “information-as-thing.” I do not dispute his main claim that 
pieces of information are objects in the world rather than mental process-
es in the head. Prototypical instances of information, such as texts and 
photographs, are clearly objects. Moreover, I agree that many other ob-
jects, such as fossils and footprints, can be quite “informative.” Although 
such objects do not represent the world as being a certain way, they can 
certainly allow someone to infer that the world is that way. For instance, 
a footprint in the mud might tell Sherlock Holmes who the murderer is. 
However, as Buckland himself admits, “to include objects and events, as 
well as data and documents, as species of information is to adopt a broad-
er concept than is common” (p. 356).
If we take disinformation to be a type of information on Buckland’s 
analysis of information, our analysis of disinformation is likely to be too 
broad. Any kind of deceptive activity would count as disinformation. For 
instance, in addition to fake radio transmissions, the Allies built fake tanks 
and airplanes out of rubber and canvas in their attempt to convince the 
Germans that the D-Day invasion would take place at Calais (Farquhar, 
2005, p. 73). These objects would count as disinformation.5 As a result, we 
would really have no need for a special term for disinformation. (We could 
just talk about deception.) In order to avoid counting all deceptive activities 
as disinformation, I take the term information to refer just to what Buck-
land (1991) calls “representations” (p. 359).
Second, according to some analyses of information (Dretske, 1983, p. 57; 
Floridi, 2011, p. 260), something can only count as information if it is true. 
As the philosopher Fred Dretske (1981) points out, “information is, after 
all, a valuable commodity. We spend billions on its collection, storage, and 
retrieval. People are tortured in attempts to extract it from them. Thou-
sands of lives depend on whether the enemy has it. Given all the fuss, it 
would be surprising indeed if information had nothing to do with truth” 
(p. 46). Thus, according to him (1983), “false information, misinforma-
tion, and (grimace!) disinformation are not varieties of information—any 
more than a decoy duck is a kind of duck” (p. 57).6 However, while the 
term information is sometimes used in a sense that implies truth, it is also 
commonly used in a sense that does not (Fox, 1983, p. 157; Scarantino & 
Piccinini, 2010, pp. 323–326). For instance, when information scientists 
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say that a library is full of information, they do not mean to be referring to 
just that subset of the collection that happens to be true. 
In any event, if we take disinformation to be a type of information on 
Dretske’s analysis of information, our analysis of disinformation will be 
too narrow. Prototypical instances of disinformation, such as the Wikipe-
dia entry claiming that Seigenthaler was involved in the Kennedy assassi-
nations, clearly involve representing the world in a way that it is not. Thus, 
in this paper, I take the term information to refer to representational con-
tent that is false, as well as to representational content that is true.
Disinformation Is Misleading Information
The second important feature of disinformation is that it is a type of mis-
leading information; that is, it is information that is likely to create false be-
liefs. It is this feature that makes disinformation dangerous and worthy of 
our concern. As noted above, disinformation can potentially have harm-
ful consequences by virtue of misleading people; if a piece of information 
is not likely to create false beliefs, then it is not really a serious threat to 
information quality. 
It should be noted that while a piece of disinformation must have the 
propensity to mislead, it does not have to actually mislead someone on 
any given occasion. Just like lying, disinformation is not a “success term.” 
You are still lying even if the person that you intend to mislead does not 
believe what you say (see Mahon, 2008). Similarly, you are still disseminat-
ing disinformation even if your target does not happen to buy it. Now, if a 
piece of disinformation does not actually mislead someone on a particular 
occasion, then it is not going to have harmful consequences on that oc-
casion. However, because it has the propensity to mislead, disinformation 
always puts people at risk of suffering harm (epistemic and otherwise). 
Therefore, it is still something that we would like to be able to identify 
and deter the spread of.
Disinformation Is Nonaccidentally Misleading Information
The third important feature of disinformation is that it must be no accident 
that it is misleading. It is this feature that distinguishes disinformation 
from more innocuous forms of misleading information, such as honest 
mistakes and overly subtle satire. Focusing on nonaccidentally mislead-
ing information puts us in a better position to detect this specific type of 
misleading information; for instance, much like lie-detection techniques, 
we can look for the intention to mislead instead of just looking for errors.
These three features of disinformation will be important in my evalua-
tion of the existing analyses of disinformation. For instance, suppose that 
an analysis counts a piece of information as disinformation even though 
it is not misleading at all or it is only accidentally misleading. That will be 
prima facie evidence that the analysis is too broad. Conversely, suppose 
that an analysis fails to count a piece of information as disinformation 
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even though it is misleading, and it is no accident that it is misleading. 
That will be prima facie evidence that the analysis is too narrow.
Previous Analyses of Disinformation
Floridi (1996)
In one of the earliest discussions of the concept of disinformation, the 
philosopher Luciano Floridi (1996) claimed that “disinformation arises 
whenever the process of information is defective” (p. 509). However, this 
analysis is too broad. When someone makes an honest mistake like the 
Chicago Tribune reporting that “Dewey Defeats Truman,” something in the 
process is defective. But such accidental falsehoods clearly are not disinfor-
mation. 
An honest mistake can certainly be misleading. For instance, after 
reading the paper on the morning of November 3rd, many Chicago resi-
dents probably believed that Thomas Dewey had been elected president. 
However, it is only an accident that they were misled. In such cases, the 
source of the information does not intend to mislead anyone (and does 
not benefit from people being misled). Also, as suggested above, indica-
tors of accidentally inaccurate information are likely to be different from 
indicators of intentionally inaccurate information. Thus, an honest mis-
take should not be counted as disinformation.
Floridi (2005)
Several years later, Floridi (2005) claimed that “when semantic content is 
false, this is a case of misinformation (Fox, 1983). And if the source of misin-
formation is aware of its nature, one may speak of disinformation” (§3.2.3; 
emphasis in original). In other words, disinformation is inaccurate in-
formation that the source knows to be inaccurate. This analysis repairs 
the shortcoming with Floridi’s 1996 analysis. It does not count accidental 
falsehoods as disinformation; when they ran the “Dewey Defeats Truman” 
story, the editors of the Chicago Tribune were not aware that the story was 
false.
However, Floridi’s 2005 analysis is also too broad. For instance, when 
you tell someone a joke or speak sarcastically, you are aware that what 
you are saying is false. But you are not spreading disinformation.7 Even 
though jokes and sarcastic comments are false, they are not misleading, 
nor are they intended to be misleading. The speaker expects her audi-
ence to also be aware that what she is saying is false. In addition, road-
maps are always inaccurate to some degree, and the cartographers are 
well-aware of this fact; for instance, if roads were really drawn to scale, 
they would be too small to see (Monmonier, 1991, p. 30). But, clearly, not 
all roadmaps are disinformation.
A story in the Onion claiming that “Al Gore Places Infant Son in Rocket 
to Escape Dying Planet” was also not disinformation, despite the fact that 
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the editors were aware that the former vice president did no such thing. 
Although a few credulous people who do not know that the Onion is satire 
might have been misled (at least briefly), it would have been totally acci-
dental. The editors of the Onion did not intend to mislead anyone. More-
over, such inaccurate information did not pose the same risk of harm to 
the recipient that prototypical instances of disinformation do. 
Fetzer (2004)
The philosopher James Fetzer (2004) claims that disinformation “should 
be viewed more or less on a par with acts of lying. Indeed, the parallel with 
lying appears to be fairly precise” (p. 231). In other words, disinformation 
is a statement that the speaker believes to be false and that is intended to 
mislead. This analysis repairs the shortcoming with Floridi’s 2005 analysis; 
for instance, it does not count jokes and sarcastic comments as disinfor-
mation. Jokes and sarcastic comments are not lies because they are not 
intended to mislead (Mahon, 2008).
However, Fetzer’s analysis is also too broad. Someone who intends to 
spread disinformation with a lie might not succeed in doing so. For in-
stance, suppose that the police ask about your friend’s whereabouts and 
that you want to mislead them about where he is. You believe that he is 
staying with his cousins outside the city, so you say to the police, “He is 
hidden in the cemetery.” However, without your knowledge, your friend 
has actually hidden himself in the cemetery. In this case, you have lied to 
the police (Mahon, 2008). (This is the opposite of an honest mistake. In-
stead of accidentally saying something false when you intend to say some-
thing true, you accidentally say something true when you intend to say 
something false.) But even though such accidental truths are lies, they are 
not disinformation because they are not actually misleading.
In addition, and more importantly, this analysis is too narrow. Lies are 
linguistic expressions, such as “a wolf is chasing my sheep!” (Mahon, 2008, 
§1.1). Thus, Fetzer’s analysis is limited to linguistic disinformation; it does 
not count deceptive images as disinformation. However, doctored photo-
graphs and falsified maps are clearly prototypical instances of disinforma-
tion. For instance, during the 2004 Presidential campaign, a photograph 
was circulated that appeared to show John Kerry and Jane Fonda sharing 
the stage at an anti–Vietnam War rally, while it was really a composite 
of two separate photographs taken at two separate events (Farid, 2009, 
p. 98). Also, during the cold war, the Soviets deliberately falsified maps in 
an attempt to fool their enemies about where important sites were located 
(Monmonier, 1991, pp. 115–118). It is no accident when people are mis-
led by such visual disinformation because that is precisely what the source 
of the information intended.
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Floridi (2011)
In his most recent discussion of the concept of disinformation, Floridi 
(2011) claims that “misinformation is ‘well-formed and meaningful data 
(i.e. semantic content) that is false.’ ‘Disinformation’ is simply misinfor-
mation purposefully conveyed to mislead the receiver into believing that 
it is information” (p. 260). In other words, disinformation is inaccurate 
information that the source intends to mislead the recipient. This is very 
close to several dictionary definitions of disinformation; for instance, the 
Oxford English Dictionary defines it as “the dissemination of deliberately 
false information.”
This analysis is along the same lines as Fetzer’s analysis, but it repairs 
the shortcomings with the latter’s: first, since Floridi explicitly requires that 
disinformation be false, accidental truths do not count as disinformation; 
second, although he tends to focus on propositional information in his work, 
Floridi (p. 84) allows that images and maps count as information. Thus, 
visual disinformation counts as disinformation in Floridi’s 2011 analysis.
However, his analysis is also too broad. Even if she/he says something 
that actually is inaccurate, someone who intends to spread disinformation 
still might not succeed in doing so. For instance, suppose a young child 
(from a conservative family) attempts to discredit Paul Krugman by post-
ing “Paul Krugman has cooties!” on Krugman’s blog at the New York Times. 
This inaccurate statement about Krugman is not going to be believed by 
any readers of the blog; even though such implausible lies are (unrealis-
tically) intended to be misleading, they are not disinformation because 
they are not actually misleading.8
In addition, and more importantly, this analysis is too narrow. Although 
prototypical instances of disinformation are inaccurate, disinformation 
can sometimes be accurate. For instance, when pursuers, who did not rec-
ognize him, asked Saint Athanasius “Where is the traitor Athanasius?” he 
replied, “Not far away.” As it was intended to do, Athanasius’s truthful 
statement misled his pursuers about his identity. Similarly, a television 
commercial that pitted Black Flag Roach Killer against another leading 
brand misled viewers about the effectiveness of Black Flag without show-
ing anything that was literally false. According to Carson (2010), “the 
demonstration used roaches that had been bred to be resistant to the type 
of poison used by the competitor” (p. 187). In addition, politicians often 
use spin to mislead the public—that is, they selectively emphasize only 
certain facts (pp. 57–58). Like prototypical instances of disinformation, 
such true disinformation is intentionally misleading and poses a similar risk 
of harm to the recipient.9
In fact, there is another respect in which Floridi’s 2011 analysis is too 
narrow. Although disinformation is always misleading, it is not always 
intended to mislead. For instance, inaccurate information has been 
intentionally placed on the internet for purposes of education and re-
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search. A website advertising a town in Minnesota as a tropical paradise 
was created to teach people how to identify inaccurate information on 
the internet (Piper, 2002, p. 19). In addition, inaccurate information has 
been inserted into Wikipedia to see how long it takes to get corrected 
(Halavais, 2004).10 In these cases, while these educators and researchers 
certainly have to foresee that people might be misled by their inaccurate 
information, they do not intend that anybody actually be misled (nor do 
they benefit from people being misled). Thus, Floridi’s 2011 analysis does 
not count this sort of inaccurate information as disinformation. 
However, such side-effect disinformation probably should count as disin-
formation. Just as with prototypical instances of disinformation, it is no 
accident when people are misled. Even though the educators and re-
searchers do not intend to mislead anyone, they do intend their inaccu-
rate information to be misleading. A fake website would not be a very 
effective tool for teaching people how to identify inaccurate information 
on the internet if it was clear to everyone that it was a fake.
Fallis (2009)
According to the information scientist Don Fallis (2009), disinformation 
is “misleading information that is intended to be (or at least foreseen to 
be) misleading” (§5). This analysis repairs the shortcomings with Floridi’s 
2011 analysis. First, since Fallis explicitly requires that disinformation 
be misleading, implausible lies do not count as disinformation. Second, 
since Fallis does not require that disinformation be inaccurate, true dis-
information counts as disinformation. Third, Fallis does not require that 
disinformation be intended to mislead; the source of the information 
merely has to foresee that it is likely to mislead. Although the educators 
and researchers described above do not intend to mislead anyone, they 
do foresee that some people may be misled. Thus, side-effect disinforma-
tion counts as disinformation in Fallis’s analysis.
However, his analysis is too broad. In addition to side-effect disinforma-
tion, it also counts some subtle forms of humor as disinformation. For in-
stance, a significant number of people are actually misled by the satirical 
stories published in the Onion (Fallon, 2012). In fact, stories from the On-
ion are sometimes picked up by serious news sources. For instance, Iran’s 
state-run news agency reported the results of a (fake) Gallup poll that 
found that “77 percent of rural Caucasian voters . . . would much rather 
go to a baseball game or have a drink with Ahmadinejad than spend time 
with Obama.” Moreover, since the editors of the Onion are clearly aware 
that this sort of thing goes on, they do foresee (even if they do not intend 
it) that at least some people will be misled by the stories they publish. But 
it is just an accident that people are misled.
Fallis’s analysis can easily be modified, however, so that it does not 
count satire as disinformation. We can simply leave off the “foreseen to 
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be misleading” clause and say that disinformation is misleading informa-
tion that is intended to be misleading. This modified analysis still counts 
side-effect disinformation as disinformation. For instance, as noted above, 
although educators do not intend to mislead anyone with their fake web-
sites, they do intend these websites to be misleading.
There are also many cases that might seem to show that Fallis’s analysis 
is too narrow. Someone can clearly spread disinformation even if she/
he does not intend, and does not foresee, that people will be misled. For 
instance, a press secretary might innocently pass along disinformation on 
behalf of her boss. But in that sort of case, there is someone (namely, the 
boss) who does intend that people be misled. Therefore, this sort of case 
does count as disinformation in Fallis’s analysis.
However, there are other cases that do indicate that Fallis’s analysis is 
too narrow. Even when a source of information does not intend to mis-
lead anyone and does not foresee that anyone will be misled, it may be no 
accident that the information is misleading. For instance, many different 
species of animals give fake alarm calls (Skyrms, 2010, pp. 73–75). When 
animals give alarm calls, there is usually a predator in the vicinity. Howev-
er, about 10 to 15 percent of the time, animals give alarm calls even when 
there is no imminent threat; in such cases, the call tends to cause other 
animals of the same species to run away and leave food behind, which the 
caller can then eat. 
There is some evidence that primates understand that other primates 
can have false beliefs (Fitzpatrick, 2009). Thus, it could be that primates 
do intend to mislead conspecifics with their fake alarm calls. However, 
when less sophisticated animals who lack this understanding, such as 
birds and squirrels, give fake alarm calls, they do not intend to mislead 
anyone, and do not foresee that anyone will be misled, about a predator 
being nearby. Even so, these animals (or at least their genes) systemati-
cally benefit from giving such deceptive signals.11 In other words, there is 
a mechanism that reinforces the dissemination of this sort of misleading 
information—namely, the caller gets a free meal. Thus, like prototypical 
instances of disinformation, such adaptive disinformation is not misleading 
by accident and poses a similar risk of harm to the recipient. 
If Fallis’s analysis simply failed to count the deceptive signals of ani-
mals as disinformation, it might not be a serious objection; after all, it is 
not clear that alarm calls have representational content and thus count as 
information. However, humans can also disseminate adaptive disinforma-
tion. For instance, many of the people who disseminate conspiracy theo-
ries (for example, that the president was not born in the United States 
or that the US government was behind the 9/11 terrorist attacks) believe 
that what they are saying is true. Thus, they do not intend to mislead any-
one, or foresee that anyone will be misled, by what they say. Even so, just 
as with prototypical instances of disinformation, these false claims can 
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mislead people, and it is no accident that people are misled. There is a 
mechanism that reinforces the dissemination of these false claims. By pro-
moting such false claims, certain websites and media outlets are able to 
attract more readers and viewers who find these claims convincing.12
Skyrms (2010)
Recent work in biology on deceptive signaling in animals might provide 
an analysis of the concept of disinformation. According to the philosopher 
Brian Skyrms (2010), “If misinformation is sent systematically and ben-
efits the sender at the expense of the receiver, we will not shrink from 
following the biological literature in calling it deception” (p. 80). Although 
Skyrms and the biologists he cites use the term deceptive signal rather than 
disinformation, they are trying to capture essentially the same concept. 
Thus, we might say that disinformation is misleading information that 
systematically benefits the source at the expense of the recipient. This 
analysis repairs the shortcoming with Fallis’s analysis. Although animals 
that give fake alarm calls may not intend to mislead others, they do sys-
tematically benefit from others being misled. Thus, adaptive disinforma-
tion counts as disinformation on Skyrms’s analysis.
However, his analysis is too narrow. Most of the time, disinformation 
imposes a cost on the recipient, as when the villagers waste their time run-
ning to the shepherd boy’s aid. However, disinformation need not always 
impose a cost on the recipient; in fact, it is sometimes intended to benefit 
the recipient. For instance, when a friend asks you how he or she looks, 
you might very well say “You look great!” in order to spare his or her feel-
ings, even if it is not true. Admittedly, such altruistic disinformation does 
not pose the same risk of harm to the recipient that prototypical instances 
of disinformation do; but like prototypical instances, altruistic disinforma-
tion can be intentionally misleading.
Skyrms’s analysis can easily be modified, however, so that it counts al-
truistic disinformation as disinformation. We can simply leave off the “at 
the expense of the recipient” clause and say that disinformation is mis-
leading information that systematically benefits the source. It is really 
just the “systematic benefit to the source” clause that is needed to count 
adaptive disinformation as disinformation. In fact, Skyrms (p. 76) himself 
notes that his analysis might be modified in this way. He just failed to see 
that this sort of modification was actually necessary.
However, Skyrms’s analysis is still too narrow because it rules out the 
possibility of disinformation that does not benefit the source. Most of the 
time, disinformation does systematically benefit the source; it often keeps 
the source out of trouble, as when Athanasius was able to escape his pur-
suers. Or it simply makes a social situation less awkward, as when you say 
to your friend “You look great!” Either way, the deceptive behavior is rein-
forced. However, disinformation need not always benefit the source; for 
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instance, in order to avoid embarrassment, people often lie to their doc-
tors about their diet, about how much they exercise, or about what medi-
cations they are taking (Reddy, 2013). If their doctors are misled, it can 
lead to incorrect treatment recommendations that can harm the patient. 
(Patients who lie may not be aware of the risk they are taking, or they may 
not be able to help themselves even though they are aware of the risk.) 
Admittedly, this particular example of detrimental disinformation may not 
pose the same risk of harm to the recipient that prototypical instances of 
disinformation do. But as with prototypical instances, it is no accident that 
people are misled by such disinformation.13
A New Analysis of Disinformation
Even though the modified Fallis analysis (in terms of an intention to be 
misleading) and the modified Skyrms analysis (in terms of a systematic 
benefit from being misleading) are too narrow, together they arguably 
capture all instances of disinformation. It would be unfortunate, however, 
if we had to resort to such a disjunctive analysis of disinformation. If an 
analysis requires two independent criteria, it suggests that we are really 
dealing with two separate phenomena (Kingsbury & McKeown-Green, 
2009, pp. 578–581). However, there is something that unifies all of the 
cases of disinformation discussed above: disinformation is misleading in-
formation that has the function of misleading someone.
Roughly speaking, a function is “the action for which a person or thing 
is particularly fitted or employed” (American Heritage, 2000).14 For in-
stance, the function of a heart is to pump blood; also, the function of a 
chair is to be sat on. According to this analysis, the distinguishing feature 
of disinformation is that its function is to mislead people.
It should be noted that there are at least two different ways that some-
thing might acquire a function (Graham, 2010, pp. 153–155; Krohs & 
Kroes, 2009). For instance, a heart has the function of pumping blood 
because that is what it evolved to do; by contrast, a chair has the function 
of being sat on because that is what it was designed to do. (Similarly, an 
artificial heart has the function of pumping blood because that is what it 
was designed to do.) In other words, the designer of the artifact intended 
it to have that function.15
Disinformation can acquire the function of misleading people in either 
of these two ways. Most forms of disinformation, such as lies and propa-
ganda, are misleading because the source intends the information to be 
misleading. But other forms of disinformation, such as conspiracy theories 
and fake alarm calls, are misleading simply because the source systemati-
cally benefits from their being misleading. Even though they might differ 
in terms of how that function was acquired, all instances of disinformation 
are unified by the fact that they have a certain function. And however that 
function was acquired, it is no accident that the information is misleading.
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This analysis of disinformation seems to include all cases of disinforma-
tion. For instance, the adaptive disinformation that caused a problem for 
the modified Fallis analysis has the function of misleading because the 
source systematically benefits from it being misleading. Also, the detri-
mental disinformation that caused a problem for the modified Skyrms 
analysis has the function of misleading because the source intends it to 
be misleading.16
In addition, this analysis seems to exclude those cases that are clearly 
not disinformation; for instance, accidental truths and implausible lies 
are not misleading. Also, while accidental falsehoods and satire can some-
times be misleading, the source of the information does not intend to 
mislead people, nor does she/he systematically benefit from people being 
misled. If people are misled, it is simply an accident. (See tables 1 and 2.)
A few things should be noted about this analysis of disinformation. 
First, the appeal to functionality makes disinformation a “historical” con-
cept; that is, whether or not a piece of information counts as disinforma-
tion does not just depend on its “perceptible and potentially perceptible 
features” (Rowe, 2012, p. 157). In particular, it is not sufficient that the 
information is misleading; it depends on how the information came to be 
misleading. In this regard, the property of being disinformation is like 
the property of being a genuine Van Gogh. Even if it were possible to cre-
ate a molecule-for-molecule reproduction of The Starry Night, it would not 
be a Van Gogh because it was not actually painted by Vincent Van Gogh 
(p. 173).
Second, the fact that different types of disinformation have acquired 
the function of misleading people in different ways can make a difference 
on how we might detect disinformation; for instance, we might look for 
evidence that someone has the intention to mislead.17 However, we might 
also look for evidence that someone benefits from people being misled.
Third, whether or not a piece of information counts as disinforma-
tion on this analysis depends on who receives it. This is because different 
things are misleading to different people. For instance, a piece of infor-
mation that is misleading to Dr. John Watson may not be misleading to 
Sherlock Holmes, Esq. A prime example is a letter forged by Professor 
Moriarty that calls Watson back to their hotel in Meiringen while Holmes 
continues on alone to that “fearful place” known as the “falls of Reichen-
bach.” Although Holmes lets Watson go, the letter—supposedly written 
by an English lady in “the last stage of consumption” who wants to see an 
English doctor—does not fool him for an instant. However, if we want the 
concept of disinformation to be person-independent, we could utilize a 
“reasonable person” standard, along the lines of the Federal Trade Com-
mission’s definition of deceptive advertising (Carson, 2010, p. 187; Fallis, 
2009). In other words, we might require that disinformation be mislead-
ing to (and have the function of misleading) a reasonable person.
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Fourth, the fact that a piece of information has the function of mis-
leading does not mean that it had that function as soon as it was created 
or first disseminated. Although the satirical stories in the Onion are not 
intended to mislead people, such a story would become disinformation if 
the editors seriously defended its accuracy in the mainstream press. Simi-
larly, a stapler does not have the function of holding a door open, but it 
can acquire that function if I start using it as a doorstop. In fact, a piece of 
information might even become disinformation through an act of omis-
sion (Carson, 2010, p. 56). If the source of a piece of information sees that 
people are misled, she/he will often have an obligation to correct their mis-
take. Therefore, if she/he has an opportunity to set the record straight 
and fails to do so, it is no longer an accident that people are misled.
Fifth, saying that disinformation has the function of misleading people 
is not meant to suggest that misleading people is the ultimate purpose of the 
dissemination of the information. Misleading people can be (and usually 
will be) just an intermediate step toward a further end. For instance, Atha-
nasius only misled his pursuers in order to escape; even so, the function 
of his misleading utterance was to mislead them.
Finally, it should be noted that while the ultimate purpose of dissemi-
nating disinformation is often problematic, it is sometimes a good thing. 
For instance, the Allies were presumably justified in using disinforma-
tion to prevent Nazi world domination. Also, the hacker who placed false 
stories on Yahoo! News apparently did so in order to expose the security 
Table 1. Data points
Clearly disinformation Reason Clearly not disinformation Reason
malicious lies (ML) nonaccidentally 
misleading
truthful statements (TS) not misleading






true disinformation (TD) nonaccidentally 
misleading




















satire (S) only accidentally 
misleading
Table 2. Analyses of disinformation and data points
Clearly disinformation Clearly not disinformation
ML VD TD SE AD AL DE TS AF J SC AT IL S
Floridi (1996) √ √ √ √ √ √ √  √   √ √  
Floridi (2005) √ √  √  √ √   √ √  √ √
Fetzer (2004) √     √ √     √ √  
Floridi (2011) √ √    √ √      √  
Fallis (2009) √ √ √ √  √ √       √
Fallis (modified) √ √ √ √  √ √        
Skyrms (2010) √ √ √ √ √          
Skyrms (modified) √ √ √ √ √ √         
New proposal √ √ √ √ √ √ √        
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weaknesses of the website so that they could be fixed. In fact, disinforma-
tion can sometimes even be a good thing, epistemically speaking. Even if a 
piece of disinformation leads to a false belief, it might lead to more true 
beliefs in the long run. For instance, as Pratchett, Stewart, and Cohen 
(1999) point out, “a lie-to-children is a statement which is false, but which 
nevertheless leads the child’s mind towards a more accurate explanation, 
one that the child will only be able to appreciate if it has been primed 
with the lie” (p. 38). An example is telling a student that electrons orbit 
the nucleus of an atom like a little solar system. 
Floridi’s Worries about the Analysis
In response to the counterexamples offered in this paper, defenders of 
the existing analyses of disinformation might try to bite these bullets; that 
is, despite the compelling fact that a piece of information is not mislead-
ing or is only accidentally misleading, they might insist that it nevertheless 
counts as disinformation. Alternatively, despite the fact that a piece of 
information is nonaccidentally misleading, they might insist that it does 
not count as disinformation. However, these seem like fairly big bullets to 
bite.
Instead of biting these bullets, Floridi (2012, pp. 306–307) has taken a 
different tack. Fallis (2011) presented several of these counterexamples 
to Floridi’s own analyses of disinformation. In his response, Floridi point-
ed out that there may not be a concise set of necessary and sufficient con-
ditions that perfectly captures the concept of disinformation. I am happy 
to concede this point. Disinformation may be a “prototype concept”; that 
is, there may simply be prototypical instances of disinformation, with dif-
ferent things falling closer to or further from these prototypes. But even 
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if it is impossible to find an analysis that perfectly captures the concept of 
disinformation (that is, one that is “counterexample proof”), we can still 
strive to get as close as we can. It seems likely that doing so would help 
us to develop better techniques for identifying disinformation and better 
policies for deterring its spread.
However, in his response, Floridi also claims that there is no point in 
getting closer to capturing the concept of disinformation than he has al-
ready done. As he puts it, “The important question to ask is not how far 
we can go with the fine slicing of a variety of different meanings and pecu-
liar cases, but whether this is worth the effort.” Floridi asks us to consider 
the following analogy: Suppose that someone wants to know “how many 
steel rails her company needs to buy to cover the distance between two 
cities.” With this purpose in mind, measuring the steel to the closest cen-
timeter would be “rather pointless.” Measuring to the closest meter would 
clearly be sufficiently precise. According to Floridi, “the criticisms offered 
by Fallis in terms of visual disinformation, true disinformation, side effect 
disinformation, and [adaptive] disinformation are interesting, but they 
concern centimetres, whereas I was giving the length of the steel rail in 
metres.”
It is certainly true that the method of conceptual analysis has sometimes 
been taken to unnecessary extremes. For instance, we might question 
whether the various analyses of knowledge that have been proposed in re-
sponse to Gettier’s (1963) counterexamples are really getting us closer to 
something with theoretical or practical utility. In fact, Weatherson (2003) 
has argued that despite the counterexamples, the justified-true-belief 
analysis of knowledge is good enough for philosophical purposes. I do not 
think this to be the case here, however; there are reasons to believe that 
none of the existing analyses of disinformation is good enough for deal-
ing with this serious threat to information quality. The counterexamples 
that I have offered to these analyses are not just logical possibilities (or 
“peculiar cases”); these forms of disinformation are fairly common real-
world phenomena that can be quite dangerous.18
Misleading images (that is, visual disinformation) might easily be more 
epistemically dangerous than misleading words; for instance, people gen-
erally take photographs to be more compelling evidence than mere tes-
timony. When we trust testimony, we know that we are putting our faith 
in the person who produced it. By contrast, a photograph has evidential 
value independent of the intentions of the person who produced it (Mo-
ran, 2005, pp. 8–11). Moreover, visual disinformation may very well be 
more prevalent than linguistic disinformation; in fact, according to Mark 
Twain (1900/2002), “By examination and mathematical computation I 
find that the proportion of the spoken lie to the other varieties is as 1 to 
22,894” (p. 169).
In a similar vein, Schauer and Zeckhauser (2009, pp. 44–46) have ar-
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gued that misleading information that is true (that is, true disinformation) 
can be more epistemically dangerous than misleading information that is 
false. Moreover, true disinformation may very well be more prevalent than 
disinformation that is actually false. There is less of a social stigma against 
simply misleading people than there is against out-and-out lying to them. 
Also, if you do not actually say anything false, it is more difficult to prove 
that you were trying to mislead anyone. Therefore, would-be deceivers 
have an incentive to stick to the truth, if they can, while still deceiving.
Finally, even if disinformation that is intended to mislead happens to 
be more prevalent than side-effect disinformation (that is not intended 
to mislead) or adaptive disinformation (that is not intended to mislead), 
it is still important to be aware of these forms of disinformation. For one 
thing, disinformation that is intended to mislead frequently is side-effect 
disinformation and/or adaptive disinformation. For instance, even when 
disinformation is only intended to mislead one particular person, it typi-
cally misleads many other people as a side effect. As Mearsheimer (2011) 
points out, “Leaders engaged in inter-state lying usually end up deceiv-
ing their own people, although they are not the intended audience” 
(p. 21). Also, even when disinformation is intended to mislead, there is 
often some additional mechanism that reinforces its dissemination. Al-
though there are certainly exceptions (such as Pinocchio), liars tend to 
benefit in some way from telling lies. 
Some Borderline Cases
Visual disinformation, true disinformation, side-effect disinformation, 
and adaptive disinformation are clearly important forms of disinforma-
tion. But it should be noted that there are other cases where it is not quite 
so clear that a piece of information has the function of misleading people 
and thus should count as disinformation. Since such borderline cases of 
disinformation could make a difference in how we try to detect disinfor-
mation or deter its spread, they deserve some consideration.
Content Is Not Misleading?
What if a piece of information is misleading (that is, it is likely to create 
false beliefs), but is not misleading about the accuracy of its content? For 
instance, suppose that you create a map of South America so that it looks 
like it was drawn by Europeans in the seventeenth century (for example, 
by its being on old parchment, with ornate lettering) to try to misled peo-
ple into thinking that Machu Picchu was discovered in the seventeenth 
century. This is certainly information that has the function of mislead-
ing. Thus, your fake map counts as disinformation in my new analysis. 
However, the content of this map is completely accurate; it is not going to 
mislead anyone about the location of Machu Picchu. With this sort of case 
in mind, we might want to amend my new analysis and reserve the term 
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disinformation for information whose representational content has the func-
tion of misleading.
Not Very Misleading at All?
What if a piece of information creates a false belief just as it was intended 
to, but it was not at all likely to create a false belief? For instance, suppose 
that the young child’s blog post, against all odds, does mislead someone 
into believing that Krugman has cooties. (After all, as the case of the On-
ion shows, people can sometimes fall for some pretty implausible stuff.) 
Although it would still be a stretch to say that the blog post was misleading 
(much less, that it had the function of misleading), it would not have been 
an accident that someone was misled. Similarly, suppose that a basketball 
player throws up a last-second shot from mid-court and it happens to go 
in. Although she or he got really lucky, the basket was not an accident; the 
player was aiming to put the ball through the hoop. It was not as if she/
he just threw the ball up into the air at random and it happened to go in.
In my new analysis of disinformation, I have not specified exactly how 
likely it must be that a piece of information will cause false beliefs in order 
for it to count as misleading. In a similar vein, epistemologists rarely spec-
ify the exact degree of justification that is required for a belief to count 
as knowledge. Most simply say that “very strong justification” is required 
(Feldman, 2003, p. 21). Along the same lines, we might require that a 
piece of information be very likely to create false beliefs in order for it to 
count as misleading. Alternatively, we might adopt a more expansive ac-
count that simply requires that a piece of information make the creation 
of false beliefs more likely than chance.19
Misleading in Some Other Way?
What if a piece of information is misleading, but not in the way it was 
intended to be misleading? For instance, suppose that you want to mis-
lead your friend into believing that Bisbee is southeast of Tombstone by 
drawing her a map. Since (unbeknown to you) Bisbee really is southeast 
of Tombstone, your map is not misleading with respect to the relative lo-
cations of the two towns. However, because you drew all of the roads with 
the same thickness, she does acquire the false belief that Tombstone and 
Bisbee are connected by an interstate highway (when, in fact, they are 
connected by a small country road). Even though your map is mislead-
ing, it does not have the function of misleading someone (about the size 
of the connecting road or anything else). Therefore, it does not count 
as disinformation in my new analysis. This seems like the correct result, 
since it was just an accident that your friend was misled about the size of 
the connecting road.
However, it should be noted that a piece of information might legiti-
mately count as disinformation even if it is not misleading in exactly the 
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way it was intended to be. For instance, suppose that Moriarty creates a 
document cleverly designed to mislead Holmes about his current where-
abouts. But it turns out that the document is not clever enough to fool 
someone with Holmes’s vaunted powers of ratiocination. While the docu-
ment is misleading to Watson, that is not what Moriarty intended. (Even 
if Watson had seen through the ruse and figured out the truth about Mo-
riarty’s whereabouts, it would not have mattered to Moriarty. He confi-
dently expects that Holmes will arrogantly ignore anything that Watson 
claims to have deduced.) Even so, it is no accident that Watson is misled. 
Since Moriarty intends the document to be misleading to Holmes, he 
does intend it to be misleading to members of the species to which Wat-
son belongs.20 Thus, this misleading information does have the function 
of misleading people such as Watson.
Just Keeps People in the Dark?
What if a piece of information is not misleading (that is, it is not likely 
to create false beliefs), but is likely to keep people in ignorance? For in-
stance, suppose that the Germans were extremely skeptical of any commu-
nications that they intercepted (which may very well have been the case). 
In that case, the fake radio transmissions would not have been likely to 
convince the Germans that the D-Day invasion would take place at Calais. 
Even so, the Allies might still have sent the transmissions in order to keep 
the Germans in the dark about where the attack would come (that is, to 
keep them from acquiring a true belief that the invasion would take place 
at Normandy). But in that case, the transmissions would not have been, 
strictly speaking, misleading. Therefore, they would not have counted as 
disinformation in my new analysis.
However, the fake radio transmissions would still have left the Germans 
epistemically worse off than they might have been (see Chisholm & Fee-
han, 1977, p. 144). This sort of manipulation of another person’s beliefs 
can be just as dangerous as prototypical instances of disinformation. For 
instance, even if a political advertisement does not convince me that a 
particular candidate would dismantle Social Security, I might still not vote 
for her or him just because I am now uncertain about what she/he would 
do. Thus, we might want to amend my new analysis and simply require 
that disinformation be likely to create false beliefs or prevent true beliefs 
(and have the function of doing so).
Applications of the Analysis
Once we have a better understanding of exactly what disinformation is, 
we are in a much better position to deal with the serious threat to infor-
mation quality that disinformation poses. My new analysis of disinforma-
tion can potentially help us to develop techniques for identifying disinfor-
mation and policies for deterring its spread.
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Many information scientists (for example, Fallis & Frické, 2002; Kunst, 
Groot, Latthe, Latthe, & Khan, 2002) are searching for indicators of in-
accurate information on the internet; that is, they are trying to identify 
features of websites that tend to be correlated with inaccuracy. Unfortu-
nately, such research has consistently failed to differentiate among the 
various types of inaccurate information (for example, between intention-
ally misleading information and accidental falsehoods). This is a serious 
flaw, as the clues that suggest that someone is lying are unlikely to be the 
same clues that suggest that a person just does not know what she/he is 
talking about. Once we clarify what disinformation is and look specifically 
for indicators of it, we are likely to find better techniques for identifying it. 
Since disseminating disinformation is still very close to lying in my new 
analysis, a lot of the vast research on lie detection can potentially be ap-
plied to disinformation detection. Researchers in lie detection have fo-
cused primarily on physiological indicators of deception, such as perspi-
ration and high pulse rate (Vrij, 2008). However, we do not always come 
into direct physical contact with sources of disinformation; and even if we 
do, we are rarely in a position to give this source a polygraph test. But re-
search is now being done to identify indicators of deception in both text 
(Newman, Pennebaker, Berry, & Richards, 2003; Rubin & Conroy 2012) 
and images (Farid, 2009, pp. 100–106). For example, researchers have 
used textual analysis to find that liars are somewhat less likely to use first-
person pronouns.
In addition, this analysis of disinformation can be used create for-
mal models of how disinformation spreads (Fallis, 2014; Skyrms, 2010, 
pp. 73–82; Sober, 1994, pp. 71–92; Tullock, 1967, pp. 133–143). One way 
in which disinformation can acquire the function of misleading is by the 
source systematically benefiting from its being misleading. In line with 
this, these formal models assume that whether a person will disseminate 
disinformation depends on the expected costs and benefits; more pre-
cisely, whether a person will disseminate disinformation depends on the 
costs of not being believed (weighted by the probability that this will hap-
pen), as compared with the benefits of being believed (weighted by the 
probability that this will happen). Such formal models can allow us to 
determine what sorts of things affect the amount of disinformation, and 
how they affect it. For instance, Fallis (2014) uses a formal model to show 
that the amount of disinformation tends to decrease when: a) the benefits 
to the recipient of believing what the source says when it is true decrease; 
b) the costs of believing what the source says when it is false increase; or 
c) the chances that the source has a motivation to deceive increase. Such 
results can potentially help us to devise policies that might deter people 
from disseminating disinformation.
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Conclusion
Disinformation can cause significant harm if people are misled by it. But 
in order to address this critical threat to information quality, we first need 
to understand exactly what disinformation is. After surveying the various 
analyses that have been proposed, I have argued that disinformation is 
misleading information that has the function of misleading.
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Notes
 1. A few information scientists (for example, Hernon, 1995, p. 134) take misinformation and 
disinformation to be mutually exclusive categories. However, it is more standard to use the 
term misinformation to refer to inaccurate information in general (Fox, 1983, p. 201), and 
to treat disinformation as a proper subset of misinformation (Floridi, 2011, p. 260; Skyrms, 
2010, p. 80).
 2. It is also important to be able to distinguish between the different types of disinformation, 
such as lies, spin, and even bullshit (Mearsheimer, 2011, p. 27).
 3. Conceptual analysis has been criticized because of this reliance upon intuitions. For example, 
several people have argued that our intuitions about hypothetical cases cannot give us 
“a priori knowledge of necessary truths” (Melnyk, 2008, p. 267). Also, there is empirical 
evidence that such intuitions are fallible (Margolis & Laurence, 2011). But even if our 
intuitions can only provide us with fallible, a posteriori knowledge, they can still be used 
effectively to test proposed analyses of important concepts.
 4. Admittedly, the term disinformation is relatively new compared with a term like knowledge. 
It is only about fifty years old. As a result, the meaning of disinformation may not be quite 
as fixed as the meaning of knowledge. Even so, we must have somewhat stable, shared in-
tuitions about the use of the term; otherwise, we would not be able to effectively use it to 
communicate with one another (Jackson, 1998).
 5. The fake thumbprint created in order to frame the “unfortunate” John Hector McFarlane 
for murder in one of the Sherlock Holmes stories would also count.
 6. Along similar lines, Floridi (2011) points out that “a false friend” is “not a friend at all” 
(p. 183). But it is not clear how far we should rely upon such analogies in our conceptual 
analysis. Other examples cut the other way; for instance, false teeth are a kind of teeth. 
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Also, we are more likely to say “the information that you gave me was incorrect” than to 
say that it was not information.
 7. Disinformation is my focus in this paper. Despite being false, jokes and sarcastic comments 
are probably not misinformation either. We should probably say that misinformation is in-
formation that is inaccurate and misleading; in fact, according to Skyrms (2010, p. 80), 
misinformation simply is misleading information.
 8. This is analogous to a young child trying to poison a sibling by putting broccoli in his or 
her food. Assuming that he or she does not happen to be allergic to broccoli, the sibling 
is not actually put in danger despite the young child’s malicious intention.
 9. Even if one agrees with Dretske and Floridi that information must be true, these examples 
show that some disinformation is information.
10. The information scientist Hernon (1995) performed a much earlier study that involved 
placing inaccurate information on the internet.
11. Birds and squirrels probably simply learn to associate making a certain vocalization and 
conspecifics running away and leaving food behind. Other species, such as fireflies, have 
evolved to send deceptive signals.
12. There is also a mechanism that reinforces the dissemination of the false claims made in 
the Onion. However, in this case, more readers are attracted to the website just because 
they find these claims amusing.
13. The source of such detrimental disinformation may not even be aware that the information 
is misleading. An extreme example is the racist statements made by the “white suprema-
cist” Clayton Bigsby (played by comedian Dave Chappelle). Bigsby is black, but he is also 
blind; he does not know that he is black and, thus, that he is one of the targets of his own 
racism. (The other members of the KKK also do not know that he is black because they 
always wear hoods at meetings.)
14. This rough characterization will be sufficient for our purposes here. But a complete analysis 
of the concept of disinformation will require a careful analysis of the concept of function. 
Krohs and Kroes (2009) provide a selection of current philosophical research in this area.
15. People certainly treat the etiological functions of biological organisms (à la Millikan, 
1984) and the design functions of artifacts (à la Dipert, 1993) as being two species of the 
same genus. As a result, several philosophers (for example, the various contributions to 
Krohs and Kroes’s Functions in Biological and Artificial Worlds [2009]) are looking to give 
a unified account of functions. But it is a difficult task to subsume one type of function 
under the other (see, for example, Vermaas & Houkes, 2003). Therefore, it may yet turn 
out that an analysis of disinformation must ultimately be disjunctive (that is, that there 
are two distinct ways in which information can be nonaccidentally misleading).
16. This is not necessarily an exhaustive list of the ways in which a piece of information can 
acquire the function of misleading. For instance, Bigsby’s racist statements (see note 13 
above) are not intended to be misleading (since he believes what he is saying); also, he does 
not ultimately benefit from disseminating this misleading information (since he himself 
is black). Nevertheless, there is clearly a mechanism that reinforces the dissemination of 
this disinformation. The members of the KKK do benefit from its dissemination, and (not 
knowing that he is black) they give him all sorts of encouragement.
17. This is how many lie-detection techniques work (Vrij, 2008). Such techniques look for 
indications, such as nervousness or apprehension, of a “guilty mind.”
18. Thus, even if we bite the bullets and do not count them as disinformation per se, visual 
disinformation, true disinformation, side-effect disinformation, and adaptive disinforma-
tion should be included in our taxonomy of epistemically dangerous information.
19. Federal law on deceptive advertising tends to set a fairly low bar. For instance, as Carson 
(2010) notes, “ads that convey false claims to 15% or more of the target audience are 
usually found to be deceptive by Lanham courts” (p. 187).
20. I am assuming here that Moriarty does not intend to take advantage of some cognitive 
quirk that is unique to Holmes. In that case, it would be an accident if Watson is misled.
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